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The Effects of Social Structure on the 2002
Elections for State Representatives
in the United States
Masayuki Hiromoto
The elections for state legislators that were held in the United States in
2002 are interesting in two respects. First of all, they were more competi-
tive than any of the state legislative elections in the past forty-eight
years. The Democratic Party had had more seats in state legislatures than
the Republican Party had since the changes of legislators following the
1952 elections. However, the tables were turned in 2002. Republicans
had more seats in the state legislatures than did Democrats even though
the difference in the number of occupied seats between the GOP and the
Democratic Party was narrow (Figure 1).
Secondly, the 2002 elections were rare midterm elections because the
percentage of state legislators belonging to the president’s party increased
after the elections. The presidents’ parties had tended to experience
declines in the number of seats in state legislatures after midterm elections
(Storey and Rose 2002, 12). The 2002 elections are an exception to this
rule. Only the 2002 and 1990 elections resulted in an increase in the
percentages of seats of the presidents’ parties in both state Senates and
Houses (Table 1).
What determined the results of the 2002 elections? As explained above,
the 2002 elections for state legislators were rare midterm elections in terms
of a win for the president’s party. It has been pointed out that President
George W. Bush’s popularity at that time gained votes for Republican candi-
dates for state legislators (Storey and Rose 2002, 12). This view may be
correct, though the president’s popularity does not completely explain why
the 2002 elections provided the president’s party with more state legislative
seats than before the midterm elections. As Table 2 shows, Dwight D.
Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton were popu-
lar in the second halves of 1954, 1962, 1986, and 1998, respectively.
However, the percentages of the presidents’ parties’ state senators and state
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representatives after the 1954 and 1962 elections, and the percentages of
the presidents’ parties’ state representatives after the 1986 and 1998 elec-
tions declined.
Campbell (2003) referred to President Bush’s approval rating in explain-
ing why the president’s party won the 2002 congressional elections.
However, he also pointed out that there had been a variety of degrees of
influences of presidents’ approval ratings on midterm elections for
Representatives. He enumerated other causes that yielded the Republican
Party’s success in the elections, suggesting that factors besides the
president’s popularity could affect election results.
Then, what factors besides the president’s popularity significantly
affected the results of the state legislative elections? Voter behavior is one
of the obvious factors affecting election results. Therefore, it is necessary
Note: The numbers are percentages of Democratic or Republican legislators in both
Democratic and Republican legislators.
Democratic-Farmer-Labor legislators in Minnesota are regarded as Democrats.
Source: The Council of State Governments. 1952–1968. The Book of the States. Vol-
umes 9–17. Chicago: The Council of State Governments.
The Council of State Governments. 1970–2003, 2005, and 2007. The Book of
the States. Volumes 18–35, 37, and 39. Lexington: The Council of State
Governments.
Figure 1. Percentages of Democratic and Republican State Legislators
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Table 2. Approval Ratings of the Presidents and
President Party
Approval
Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr.
Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–54) R – 68 – 71 68 –
Dwight D. Eisenhower (1957–58) R – – 60 58 52 54
John F. Kennedy (1961–62) D – – 77 78 79 –
Lyndon B. Johnson (1965–66) D 66 62 59 61 58 –
Richard Nixon (1969–70) R 68 – 61 66 53 –
Richard Nixon (1973–74) R 27 31 27 28 25 26
Gerald Ford (1974) R
Jimmy Carter (1977–78) D 56 57 55 47 – 40
Ronald Reagan (1981–82) R 53 49 49 47 46 –
Ronald Reagan (1985–86) R 62 63 64 – 63 62
George H. W. Bush (1989–90) R 70 71 80 73 68 68
Bill Clinton (1993–94) D 48 52 54 53 50 51
Bill Clinton (1997–98) D 59 56 59 69 63 67
George W. Bush (2001–02) R 87 86 84 82 81 76
George W. Bush (2005–06) R 37 42 – – – –
Note: The table shows the approval ratings of the presidents for one year before the midterm elections
and in the month when the midterm elections were held.
If two or more opinion surveys on approval ratings of the president were conducted in a month,
An opinion survey that started late in a month and ended early in the next month is regarded as
A percentage of the president’s party’s state legislators means a percentage of state legislators who
Dotted numbers signify that percentages of seats of the presidents’ parties in the major parties’
Source: Gallup, George H. 1972. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935–1971. New York: Random House.
Gallup, George H. 1978. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1972–77. Wilmington: Scholarly
Gallup, George H. 1979. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1978. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources
Gallup, George H. 1982. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1981. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources
Gallup, George H. 1983. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1982. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources
Gallup, George H. 1984. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1983. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources
Gallup, George, Jr. 1987. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1986. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources
Gallup, George, Jr. 1988. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1987. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources
Gallup, George, Jr. 1991. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1990. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources
Gallup, George, Jr. 1992. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1991. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources
Gallup, George, Jr. 1996. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1995. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources
Gallup, George, Jr. 1999. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1998. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources
Gallup, George, Jr. 2003. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 2002. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources
Gallup, Alec M. and Frank Newport, eds. 2006. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 2005. Lanham:
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Percentages of Presidents’ Parties’ State Legislators
Rating Senators of the Representatives of
May June July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. President’s Party the President’s Party
64 61 – 70 – – (63 in Dec.) 49.8%→43.7% 50.2%→43.2%
– – – – 56 – 52 41.3%→33.5% 44.5%→34.3%
73 71 66 67 62 – 74 65.1%→62.8% 60.8%→59.8%
54 – 56 51 48 – 48 68.0%→59.6% 66.3%→58.4%
57 – 61 55 56 – 57 43.9%→40.5% 42.5%→38.6%
25 28 24 24
71 50 53 47 39.6%→32.2% 40.4%→31.8%
43 – 40 – 56 – 52 67.9%→65.6% 67.9%→63.0%
44 – – 41 42 42 43 38.6%→37.5% 40.0%→36.9%
68 61 63 61 61 63 – 38.8%→39.3% 42.5%→39.6%
65 67 63 74 74 66 58 38.7%→39.0% 39.9%→40.4%
51 46 43 43 39 42 46 58.9%→52.3% 59.0%→51.7%
64 60 61 64 62 63 66 51.5%→52.3% 52.9%→52.8%
77 70 76 68 66 67 63 48.5%→50.9% 48.1%→49.9%
– – – – – – – 50.3%→47.4% 49.8%→44.9%
the result of the survey conducted earlier or earliest is shown in the table.
the first opinion survey in the latter month.
belonged to the president’s party in Democratic and Republican legislators.
seats increased after midterm elections.
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to focus on voters when examining who wins an election. The 2002 elec-
tions for state legislators could have involved mobilizers that made electors
vote for candidates of the president’s party. Social cleavages and social
networks are factors that can mobilize voters. Such factors could influence
the results of the 2002 state legislative elections more than the other mid-
term elections because the 2002 elections did not accord with the
president’s party’s defeat in midterm elections. Scholars have explained
that social cleavages and social networks prompted people to support a cer-
tain party or to participate in political activities. The social structure com-
posed of social cleavages and social networks may unify people to vote for
candidates of a certain party.
Some researchers have indicated that election systems determined the
results of elections for members of state legislatures. For example, differ-
ent tendencies were seen in the results of elections between single-member
districts and multi-member districts (Moncrief and Thompson 1992). How-
ever, according to state government websites that show the results of the
state upper house elections and lower house elections, the state govern-
ments did not change their state legislative election systems with only
single-member districts to systems with multi-member districts, or their
election systems involving multi-member districts to systems with only
single-member districts between the 2002 elections and their previous
elections. This article focuses on voters, not election systems.
Literature on Elections for State Legislators
Some scholars have tried to empirically reveal the determinants of the
results of elections for members of state legislatures, and have expressed
insights that this article can develop further.
Stonecash (1999) attempted to prove that voter income influenced which
party won state House elections in districts. The subjects of his study
were members of state Houses as of January 1994 in all of the states except
Nebraska, which had nonpartisan state legislative elections. Probit and
lambda were employed as the methods of the analysis in order to reveal the
influence of income on which party won in the district. The results of the
analysis showed that voters in low-income districts tended to vote Demo-
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cratic across the nation and that states remarkably showed various degrees
of income’s influence over election results. Stonecash was interested in
how constituents’ income influenced election results rather than whether
there were other significant factors that played a role in determining elec-
tion results.
Lubin and Voss (2000) confirmed the relationship between racial compo-
sition and competition between the Democratic Party and the Republican
Party in state legislative elections. Data was obtained from the elections
that were held in ten southern states from 1990 to 1998. The method of
the analysis was logit because the dependent variable of whether or not a
winner in a district was a Democrat was dichotomous. The results showed
that Democratic candidates were apt to be successful in districts with fewer
European-American people and that districts with few African-American
dwellers tended to yield Democratic state representatives in states that
included the Appalachian Mountains. Lubin and Voss paid attention to the
South because they were interested in the implication of race on the elec-
tion results in the southern states that created majority-minority districts.
Hogan (2003) revealed the influence of districts’ characteristics and legis-
lative institutions over contestation and competition between Democratic
candidates and Republican ones in state legislative elections. Contestation
signifies whether both Democratic and Republican members stood as candi-
dates for state legislators in a district, while competition means how close
the numbers of votes for Democratic and Republican candidates were. He
used the data on state legislative elections held in thirty states from 1994 to
1996. His methods of analysis for research on competition were OLS
analysis. The dependent variable of competition was 100 minus the per-
centage of the successful candidate’s votes in votes for Democratic and
Republican candidates. The independent variables could be divided into
two groups: district features and legislative institutions. The independent
variables of districts’ features were social diversity, partisan diversity, popu-
lations, and the districts’ urbanism. Social diversity in a district was mea-
sured by focusing on the residents’ income, work, education, age, and
race. The partisan diversity in a district was gauged in terms of the resi-
dents’ race, income, education, and work. The results of the analysis
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showed that not only legislative institutions but also a district’s features
influenced the elections. Social diversity and political diversity were
significant in the analysis of competition. However, it was not clear how
significantly the individual elements of social diversity or political diversity,
such as income, work, education, age, and race, contributed.
The studies described above make certain points that should be attended
to before explaining the research design of the present article. First of all,
these studies except for Stonecash’s limited the number of states whose leg-
islative elections were objects of studies. The present article used data
regarding as many states as possible. Districts’ characteristics that are sig-
nificant determinants of an election result in a single state or region com-
posed of some states might not be significant in an analysis of legislative
elections throughout the entire whole country. If the object of study is a
general tendency common to all of the state elections in the United States
rather than to a certain area within the country, data from as many states as
possible should be included in the study.
Secondly, the research of Stonecash, and Lubin and Voss focused on
which party won in a district. The present article employed the percentage
of votes for a party in a district as representative of the voters’ preference in
the district. Although it is appropriate to regard the party that wins an
election as indicative of the voters’ choice, it is more precise to examine
what percentage of voters in a particular district are expressive of the will of
a political party.
Thirdly, the literature has focused on elements that led to a party’s wins
in state legislative elections. This is an important point of view for
researchers examining state legislative elections. However, there can be
other cogent ways to explain election results. As Hogan showed, one of is
to investigate what caused huge or narrow margins in the elections. Social
cleavages and social networks may function not only as mobilizers of voters
that support a certain party but also as builders of strong bases that produce
one-sided victories. The present article tried to examine voting percent-
ages for Republican candidates, or conversely for Democratic candidates,
and voting margins for Democratic candidates and Republican candidates.
Fourthly, although the studies described above found factors that influ-
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enced election results, such factors are not necessarily the only ones that
determine election results. Districts’ characteristics such as voters’
income, race, work, education level, age, and a district’s urbanism may be
important in determining the reasons for the election of Democratic or
Republican candidates in districts. However, other factors could have
affected the 2002 state legislative elections. The analysis described in the
present article examined potential determinants which have been the sub-
ject of earlier studies as well as factors that have been previously overlooked.
Fifth, the literature on state legislative elections has not always been sen-
sitive to distinctions between social cleavages and social networks that can
be determinants of state legislative elections. In other words, the previous
studies have not paid enough attention to relationships between social cleav-
ages and social networks that can influence election results. Thus, the
present study employed a model that takes into account the relationships
between social cleavages and social networks. Furthermore, research
regarding how social cleavages influence politics and how social networks
affect politics do not necessarily take social networks and social cleavages
together into consideration, as shown below. Although this article recog-
nizes that social cleavages or social networks are individually useful in
explaining politics, it develops an analytical model for examining politics by
combining the two concepts.
The present study employed an analysis that addressed the five points
mentioned above. This analysis used data from as many states as possible
and assumed that a variety of factors affected the election results in order to
reveal what determined the vote percentages for a party in a district and
what influenced the degree of one-sided elections. This article also tried to
clarify the relationship between social cleavages and social networks them-
selves.
Research Design
Literature on Social Cleavages Influencing Politics
Social cleavages may affect results of elections for state legislators.
Some empirical studies have revealed social cleavages that significantly
affected presidential or congressional elections. It has been explained that
修道法学 30巻 2号
116―　　―341（119）
people who belong to a certain cleavage tend to support either the Demo-
cratic Party or the Republican Party.
Brooks and Manza (1997) explained that while race, religion, class, and
gender were social cleavages that determined results of nine presidential
elections held from 1960 to 1992, race was in particular a critical determi-
nant of the elections. One of Brooks and Manza’s findings was that
African-Americans tended to vote for Democratic candidates rather than
Republican candidates.
Stonecash and Lindstrom (1999) regarded class as an essential social
cleavage in their analysis that employed family income as an indicator of
class. They argued that voter income was a factor that influenced the
results of elections for members of the House of Representatives held from
1962 to 1996. Low income families showed a tendency to support the
Democratic Party. Moreover, Stonecash and Lindstrom pointed out that
class and race at the district level did not have a strong correlation.
Analysis that controlled for race revealed a negative correlation between
family income and support for the Democratic Party.
Miller and Lockerbie (1992) revealed determinants of voting behavior in
presidential elections and partisan self-identification in 1956, 1972, and
1984. They conducted multiple regression analyses with the dependent
variables of voting for the Democratic candidate and of supporting the
Democratic Party, and with the independent variables of African-American,
low income, union member, blue-collar worker, working-class identification,
and so on. The results of their analyses showed that race and income
were the social cleavages that determined the election results. The inde-
pendent variables of Black, low income, and union member were statisti-
cally significant at the 0.05 level for elections in 1972 and 1984. Blacks, a
low-income group, and union members tended to vote for Democratic candi-
dates for president and to support the Democratic Party. The independent
variable of blue-collar worker was not statistically significant in the three
years for the analysis of presidential votes and in 1956 for the analysis of
party identification. Working-class identification was not a determinant of
presidential votes in 1972 and 1984 and of party identification in 1972.
Manza and Brooks (1999) showed the predicted probabilities of prefer-
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ring Democratic candidates to Republican ones in the 1960 through 1992
presidential elections for groups of cleavages. It can be said that race was
the cleavage within which groups clearly held different preferences. More
than ninety percent of African-Americans favored Democratic candidates in
1960 through 1992. However, religion, class, and gender did not express
differences in preference for presidential candidates among internal
groups. Jews and people with no religious affiliation were exceptional reli-
gious groups because more than fifty percent of the members of these two
groups preferred Democratic candidates in 1960 through 1992. The major-
ity of liberal Protestants, moderate Protestants, conservative Protestants,
and Catholics supported Democrats in some years and backed Republicans
in other years. The groups in the class cleavage which included profes-
sionals, managers, routine white-collar employees, self-employed, skilled
workers, and nonskilled workers were also volatile in their support of either
Democrats or Republicans.
The above review of the literature suggests that race and class are social
cleavages which may be significant in state legislative elections. While
people’s job types do not appear to be influential determinants of their politi-
cal behavior and political thought, income as an expression of class can
influence which party’s candidate people vote for or which party people
support. In the present study, a model that considered social cleavages the
basis of voting behavior was constructed. One of possible reasons why
some social cleavages did not significantly influence people’s political behav-
ior and thought is because social networks are more effective in politics
than are those social cleavages. It is thus necessary to take social net-
works into consideration.
Literature on Social Networks Influencing Politics
Even though race and class influence voting behavior, there may be varia-
tions in election results in districts composed of similar social cleavages.
Social networks, that is, linkages among people that have similar affinities in
society, encourage people to act. Studies focusing on social networks
seem helpful in specifying factors that may significantly influence the
results of elections for state legislators.
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A study conducted by La Due Lake and Huckfeldt (1998) showed that
some elements of social networks facilitated political participation among
network members. Their study focused on levels of education as a factor
that facilitates political participation among social network members. The
analysis revealed that in the 1992 presidential election a high level of educa-
tion functioned as a promoter of the development of social networks and of
inducing network members to go to the polls. Income, employment, race,
and age, as well as education, promoted the formation of social networks.
People who earned more money, were employed, were racial minorities, or
were older, tended to be members of organizations. People with higher
levels of education were prominent in creating resources for increasing
political expertise and providing information useful for political participation.
Several studies have revealed elements that stimulate the formation and
behavior of social networks, though such studies have not demonstrated
that these elements promote the political activities of network members.
However, such elements can influence which candidate people vote for in
state legislative elections. It is meaningful to take a look at these elements
here.
Beggs, Haines, and Hurlbert (1996) compared personal networks in rural
areas and personal networks in urban areas. They found that rural net-
works were apt to have more durable memberships, a higher proportion of
kin and neighbors, more members, and more intense relations among mem-
bers than do urban networks.
O’Donnell (1983) explained that children influence their parents’ social
networks. Parents seek the support and companionship of other parents
with young children. New mothers have contacts with acquaintances that
attended childbirth education classes and women that have infants and live
in their neighborhoods. Preschoolers offer their parents opportunities for
participating in their neighborhoods. Parents with preschoolers often join
in community-based children’s programs. Preschools give parents
chances to meet other parents. Parents of school-aged children also par-
ticipate in neighborhood and community-based activities. The parents join
in churches, schools, and other voluntary organizations that offer children’s
programs.
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Stueve (1983) argued that the elderly are active members of social
networks. The elderly not only receive help from people but also offer
other people support. This mutual help leads the elderly to engage in
social networks. The elderly are members of networks formed by their
kin. Longer life expectancy makes it possible for the elderly to be in con-
tact not only with their children and grandchildren but also with their
great-grandchildren, siblings, and elderly children. The elderly are also
members of social networks that friends, neighbors, and voluntary groups
build. They become incorporated into communities through these social
networks.
Giranda, Luk, and Atchison (1999) also examined the social networks of
the elderly. One of their points of interest was the degree of elderly
people’s involvement in networks. Four kinds of networks were examined
in the analysis: family networks, friendship networks, confidant networks,
and mutual support networks. The study participants were grouped into
four categories: aged persons with no living children, aged persons with no
children living near their parents, aged persons with one child living near
their parents, and aged persons with two or more children living near their
parents. A noteworthy result of the analysis is that there no significant dif-
ferences were observed in the degree of the aged people’s involvement in
friendship networks among the four categories of the respondents. The
elderly tended to be more involved with family, confidant, and mutual sup-
port networks if they had more children. However, friendship networks
did not subscribe to this tendency. Moreover, the degree of involvement
in friendship networks was higher than the degrees of involvement in confi-
dant and mutual support networks, and as high as the degrees of involve-
ment in family networks. These findings indicate that the elderly cultivate
friendships and build networks even on the part of aged persons who have
few kin. Similarly, the qualitative data reported by Mac Rae (1992) re-
vealed that childless elderly women tended to participate in social networks
consisting of close friends.
Cochran (1990) enumerated social-structural factors that determined
membership in social networks. These factors are education, job, income,
house ownership, race, and family structure. A high level of educational
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attainment offers people jobs by which they earn much money. Jobs pro-
mote the formation of social networks, and even persons with low-income
jobs can easily become members of social networks through their place of
employment. Large income makes it possible for people to own houses
and move to areas in which neighboring with residents is feasible.
Cochran also pointed out that there were only a limited number of cross-
racial networks. Separation of network membership exists in terms of
race. The family structure that Cochran regarded as a significant factor
was one- or two-parent families. Single parents utilize fewer social
resources that are helpful in building and maintaining social ties than do
parents in two-parent families.
Ajrouch, Antonucci, and Janevic (2001) showed how the characteristics of
social networks differed between African-Americans and European-
Americans in Detroit. Their analysis revealed that European-Americans
joined larger social networks than did African-Americans. Not only race but
also marital status, gender, education, and age affected the size of social net-
works. Married people, females, those more educated, and younger people
were found inclined to have larger social networks. Race also influenced
frequency of contact with network members though age attenuated this
influence. African-Americans came in more contact with network members
than did European-Americans while this tendency weakened as people
became older. Moreover, married people, females, those less educated,
and younger people tended to have more contact with network members.
Carroll and Teo (1996) explained the characteristics of social networks
that managers constructed. Comparison with nonmanagers revealed that
managers tended to belong to more clubs and societies, to have more
co-workers and higher proportions of co-workers in social networks, to have
more close ties and higher proportions of close ties, and to be members of
larger networks than did nonmanagers.
Tagliaventi and Mattarelli (2006) empirically explained that different
groups of professionals construct linkages with each other in sharing
knowledge. They presumed that each professional group forms a commu-
nity of practice. Members of the community jointly own working practices
and values. Professional groups in different organizations constitute
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networks. Members of the networks also share professional skills and
values. Tagliaventi and Mattarelli conducted ethnographic research of a
hospital unit in order to prove this supposition.
The studies of social networks described above enumerated factors that
may influence election results. Those factors include education, employ-
ment, urbanization, having young children, being elderly, family structure,
and house ownership besides income, job type, race, and sex, which are re-
garded as factors concerning social cleavages. This article also included
elements whose influence over the formation of social networks has been
illustrated in previous studies.
Method of Analysis
As shown above, scholars have used social cleavages or social networks to
explain political phenomena. The present study assumes that social cleav-
ages and social networks function together as mobilizers of votes. Social
cleavages are divisions of people in accordance with their social statuses
while social networks are social linkages that people construct. It can be
said that although the former is a state, the latter is an action or the product
of an action. A single segment of a social cleavage can include people who
vote for a particular candidate as well as people who do not vote for that
candidate. This is in part because a social network influences its members
but is powerless over nonmembers even though its members and nonmem-
bers belong to the same segment of a social cleavage. This article supposes
that social cleavages and social networks have connections with each other.
For this study, two path analyses were conducted in order to explain how
social cleavages and social networks influenced the elections for state repre-
sentatives in 2002. The subject of the analyses was the elections for repre-
sentatives of state Houses held in the U.S. states in 2002. Nebraska was
excluded from the analyses because Nebraska had no candidates in the
2002 elections who belonged to political parties. It was impossible to use
social cleavages or social networks to explain which political party obtained
votes. Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Virginia did not hold gen-
eral elections for state legislators in 2002. Therefore, the elections for
lower house members in these four states may not be influenced by factors
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that affected the 2002 elections in other states, such as the president’s
popularity. Kansas, New Mexico, and South Carolina did not hold general
elections for state senators in 2002 but held elections for lower house
members. In order to employ data from as many states as possible, the
analysis was conducted using data regarding elections for members of the
lower houses.
The unit of analysis was each district. Data concerning social cleavages
and social networks of all the counties contained in a district were regarded
as the district’s data.
The analysis excluded districts in which a Democrat or a Republican did
not stand as a candidate in order to compete with his or her hostile major
party’s candidate for the seat, or in which the number of candidates was the
same as or fewer than the number of lower house members expected to be
elected. Analysis of lower house members had more cases than the analy-
sis of state senators because lower house elections had more districts in
each state than did state senator elections. The numbers of Democratic
and Republican state lower house members as of 2001 are, respectively,
2,810 and 2,604. The numbers of Democratic and Republican state lower
house members as of 2003 are, respectively, 2,694 and 2,687 (The Council
of State Governments 2002, 2003). Although Democratic lower house
members outnumbered Republican lower house members after the 2002
elections, the numbers of Democratic and Republican lower house mem-
bers became close after the elections.
One of the two analyses intended to disclose how social cleavages and
social networks influenced the degree of one-sidedness of votes in a
district. The other analysis aimed to reveal how social cleavages and social
networks affected votes obtained by a candidate or candidates of the Repub-
lican Party in a district. The former analysis employed as a variable the
percentage of votes for candidates of a major party whose votes were more
than the other major party’s ones in the total votes for candidates of the
Democratic Party and the Republican Party. The latter analysis used as a
variable the percentage of votes that Republican candidates gained in total
votes cast for both Republican and Democratic candidates. These analyses
regarded Democratic-Farmer-Labor candidates in Minnesota and Demo-
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Table 3. Total of Explained Variance for Variables of Class
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
% of Cumulative % of CumulativeComponent Total
Variance %
Total
Variance %
1 1.794 89.690 89.690 1.794 89.690 89.690
2 .206 10.310 100.000
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cratic-NPL candidates in North Dakota as Democrats. If the votes were
re-counted, the re-counted numbers were used for the analyses.
The first analysis attempted to determine which social cleavage or social
network could offer a political party a large sum of votes in the elections.
The analysis used two variables of social cleavages, race and class, and
three variables of social networks.
The variable of race showed a degree of uniformity. Districts’ degrees
of uniformity in race were considered the sum of the squared proportions of
five racial categories, White, Black, Native Alaskan, Asian and Pacific
Islander, and Hispanic or Latino. While the degree is high when people of
a certain racial group constitute a large majority in a district, the degree
tends to be low when the numbers of people of five racial groups are alike
in a district.
The variable of class was the principal component scores that indicated
the residents’ degree of wealth. The scores were calculated by principal
component analysis using the variables of personal income per capita and of
percentage of managers and professionals in civilian employees sixteen
years of age or older. The principal component analysis employed a corre-
lation matrix. Table 3 shows the components’ eigenvalues. The first prin-
cipal component had an eigenvalue of more than 1.000. The contribution
ratio of the first principal component was .897. According to the eigenvec-
tors shown in Table 4, the first principal component was named the wealthy.
The variables of social networks were the principal component scores
that were calculated using variables of education, urbanization, having
young children, the elderly, family structure, house ownership, and employ-
ment or, conversely, unemployment. To be exact, the variables were the
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Table 4. Component Matrix for Variables of Class
Component
1
Income .947
Managers and Professionals .947
percentage of people with bachelor’s degrees or higher among those
twenty-five years of age or older, population density, percentage of people
seventeen years old or under, percentage of people sixty-five years of age or
older, average number of family members, percentage of those who owned
the houses they lived in, and unemployment rate. It is easier to grasp the
influence of social networks by using some variables that are obtained by
combining seven indicators of social networks than by using all seven vari-
ables of social networks. Because social networks can overlap, uniting
some indicators of social networks diminishes the complexity of the
analysis. As Table 5 shows, the first, second, and third principal compo-
nents had eigenvalues of more than 1.000. The contribution ratio of the
first through third principal components was .792. The eigenvectors
shown in Table 6 could make it possible to determine the first, second, and
third principal components as young family, rural area, and the unem-
ployed, respectively.
Table 5. Total of Explained Variance for Variables of Social Networks
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
% of Cumulative % of CumulativeComponent Total
Variance %
Total
Variance %
1 2.288 32.688 32.688 2.288 32.688 32.688
2 1.836 26.224 58.912 1.836 26.224 58.912
3 1.420 20.279 79.192 1.420 20.279 79.192
4 .502 7.175 86.367
5 .377 5.391 91.757
6 .332 4.736 96.494
7 .245 3.506 100.000
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Table 6. Component Matrix for Variables of Social Networks
Component
1 2 3
Bachelors .231 –.619 –.604
Population Density .204 –.737 .454
Children .811 .425 .042
The Elderly –.827 .081 .324
Family Members .784 .367 –.045
Owned Houses –.404 .756 –.225
Unemployment .272 .125 .830
The following are the hypotheses for the first analysis. A high degree of
uniformity in race causes a one-sided result in an election. High personal
income per capita and the inclusion of many managers and professionals
lead to the formation of networks that also produce a high degree of one-
sidedness in an election result. A district that includes many bachelors or
that with a low population density yields networks among residents that can
be mobilizers of votes for a certain candidate. Households with children,
the elderly, or many family members form networks via family
members. A district which contains many owned houses or employed
workers produces a mass of votes for a candidate through networks formed
in communities or workplaces.
As explained above, a social cleavage is a state of society, while a social
network is people’s action or a product of people’s action. Therefore, a so-
cial cleavage influences the formation of a social network. The first path
analysis premised relations among the social cleavages and the social net-
works shown in Figure 2.
The second analysis of votes for Republicans also included five variables
that were presumed to influence voting. Two of the five variables were
related to social cleavages. They included the percentage of European-
Americans in the total population and the principal component scores
concerning wealth, that is, the same scores as the first path analysis
employed. Three other variables were the principal component scores that
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Figure 2. Model for Analysis
represented education, urbanization, having young children, the elderly,
family members, house ownership, and unemployment, which the first path
analysis employed.
The studies referred to above did not indicate that managers and profes-
sionals were regarded as stable predictors of which party people backed,
that people with bachelor’s degrees or higher were apt to vote for Republi-
cans, or that families with young children, aged members, many members,
or their own houses tended to support the Republican Party. In this sense,
the variables concerning these factors may not be useful in the second
analysis of votes for Republicans. However, the second analysis employed
these variables in the same way as did the first analysis, because it was nec-
essary to use the variables that represent the same social cleavages and
social networks in order to compare the two roles of social cleavages or
social networks, that is, the collection of a massive number of votes for
either party and the acquisition of votes for a particular party.
The hypotheses of the second analysis are as follows. Whites and high
earners are inclined to cast ballots for Republican candidates. People in
areas whose population density is low tend to have close contact with each
other and to vote for Republican candidates. A low unemployment rate
makes people support Republican candidates because of a lower degree of
dissatisfaction concerning economic matters. The second analysis also
premised the relations among the social cleavages and the social networks
that were shown in Figure 2.
Data regarding the results of the elections for state House representatives
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Table 7. Statistical Summary of Variables
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Votes for the Republican Party 49.4 16.0
Votes for the Party that Obtained More Votes 63.0 9.2
Whites 79.1 18.3
Racial Unification 71.0 18.6
Personal Income 30,478.1 7,874.6
Managers and Professionals 33.1 6.2
Bachelor’s Degrees or Higher 24.1 8.7
Population Density 516.0 2,086.1
0–17 Years Old 24.7 2.5
65 Years Old and Over 12.7 3.0
Family Members 2.6 0.2
Owned Houses 68.1 9.0
Unemployment 5.4 1.7
held in 2002 came from websites of the state governments. 2004 County
and City Extra (Gaquin and DeBrandt 2004) has each county’s data describ-
ing total population in 2002, the percentages of Whites, Blacks, American
Indians and Alaska Natives, Asians and Pacific Islanders, and Hispanics or
Latinos in 2002, the number of people employed in 2000, the percentage of
managers, professionals, and related occupations in 2000, the percentage of
those holding bachelor’s degrees or higher in 2000, land area in square kilo-
meters in 2000, the percentages of populations in age brackets in 2002, the
number of households in 2000, the number of occupied housing units in
2000, the percentage of owner-occupied housing units in 2000, the size of
the civilian labor force in 2002, and the number of unemployed persons in
2002. 2005 County and City Extra (Gaquin and DeBrandt 2005) includes
each county’s data regarding total personal income in 2002. As explaind
above, data concerning social cleavages and social networks of all the coun-
ties included in a district were regarded as the district’s data. Table 7
shows the average and the standard deviation of each data set.
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Results of Analyses
Table 8 presents the results of the path analysis including the variable of
the election’s degree of one-sidedness. The variables of race, rural area,
and the unemployed had higher absolute values of standardized coefficients
than did the variables of wealth and the age of the family. The standard-
ized coefficients of these three variables could not support the hypotheses
concerning them, which were that the percentage of votes for a successful
party in a district would be higher if the degree of racial uniformity was
higher, the degree of urbanism was lower, or there were more employed
people. However, the results of the analysis did show that a district with
low racial uniformity, high urbanism, or many unemployed people tended to
gave a party one-sided victory. Although the standardized total effect of
the variable concerning race was also high, the sign of the standardized
total effect was negative. The signs of the variable of the wealthy and that
of young family supported the hypotheses regarding class, the presence of
Table 8. Results of Analysis of Votes for Winning Party
Squared Multiple
Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom Probability Level Correlation for
Variable of Vote
696.598 3 <.001 .115
Variable Standardized p
Coefficient
Vote ← Racial Uniformity –.121 <.001
Vote ← The Wealthy .054 .045
Vote ← Young Family .085 <.001
Vote ← Rural Area –.145 <.001
Vote ← The Unemployed .196 <.001
Variable Standardized Total
Effect
Vote ← Racial Uniformity –.258
Vote ← The Wealthy .034
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children, and the number of family members. Namely, a higher social
class, families with children, or families with many members were apt to
form a base that produced massive votes for a certain party.
The results of the analysis of votes for the Republican Party are eluci-
dated in Table 9. The variables regarding Whites and rural area had rela-
tively high absolute values of standardized coefficients in the five variables
that were assumed to influence voting. The standardized total effect of the
variable of Whites was also high and positive. Republican candidates
tended to succeed in districts that had many European-Americans, that
were depopulated, or that had many owned houses. Although the vari-
ables of young family and of the unemployed had lower absolute values of
standardized coefficients than the variables of Whites and rural area, the
standardized coefficients of the two variables were significant at the five per-
cent level. Their coefficients show that Republican candidates were apt to
win in districts with many children, many family members, low unemploy-
ment rates, or many people who had bachelor’s degrees or higher.
Table 9. Results of Analysis of Votes for the Republican Party
Squared Multiple
Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom Probability Level Correlation for
Variable of Vote
755.136 3 <.001 .155
Variable Standardized p
Coefficient
Vote ← Whites .270 <.001
Vote ← The Wealthy .046 .077
Vote ← Young Family .070 .002
Vote ← Rural Area .259 <.001
Vote ← The Unemployed –.107 <.001
Variable Standardized Total
Effect
Vote ← Whites .314
Vote ← The Wealthy –.051
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One of the remarkable differences between the results of the first analy-
sis and those of the second analysis was the number of significant variables
whose coefficients’ signs could reasonably explain the relation with the vari-
ables of votes. The analysis of one-sidedness revealed that the variables of
wealth and young family were significant at the five percent level and that
class and networks including children or family members were effectual in
forming firm bases for a certain party. The analysis of votes for Republi-
cans made it clear that the signs of the coefficients of the variables of
Whites, young family, rural area, and the unemployed could reasonably
explain how Republican candidates obtained votes. Namely, social cleav-
ages and social networks could have more influence on which party resi-
dents voted for than on how solid a party’s base was.
Discussion
The two analyses described above revealed how social cleavages and social
networks influenced the results of elections for state House representatives
held in 2002. As Table 9 shows, Whites had the most influence over votes
for Republican candidates. However, Table 8 indicates that high
racial uniformity could not lead to one-sided victories. Therefore, the
analyses in this study reveal race’s function in collecting votes for a particu-
lar party. Lubin and Voss (2000) found that racial composition in districts
tended to affect whether the Democratic Party or the Republican Party won
the state legislative elections in ten southern states. The findings in this
article support Lubin and Voss’s argument and show that a relationship
between races and parties winning in districts tended to exist across the
nation.
Table 8 shows that high social class tended to cause one-sided victories in
certain districts. Stonecash (1999) found that low-income districts tended
to lead to success by Democrats across the nation. Social class had the
other function of gathering massive numbers of votes for a party.
Hogan (2003) found that social diversity and political diversity, as mea-
sured by income, work, education level, age, and the race of a district’s
inhabitants, influenced degree of competitiveness of an election. However,
his findings did not show which elements of diversity were especially influ-
327（105）
Masayuki Hiromoto : The Effects of Social Structure on the 2002 Elections
for State Representatives in the United States
131―　　―
ential, as could the present study that revealed the elements that affected an
election’s competitiveness.
The results of the analyses in this article raised some questions regarding
the roles of social cleavages and social networks in elections. First, while
high racial uniformity in a district did not necessarily cause a high degree of
one-sidedness in an election result, the question arises as to why racial
group had the most important effect on the victories of Republican
candidates. Second, it may be sought to interpret why social networks in
rural areas and social networks of employees tended to offer Republican
candidates a victory and not construct a solid base for a party regardless of
political ideology.
The first question concerns the effect of race on election results. The
second analysis revealed that Whites tended to vote for Republican candi-
dates and that the variable of Whites was the most influential in determin-
ing voting rates for Republican candidates. These findings are consistent
with results of the analysis reported by Brooks and Manza (1997), who
showed that racial cleavage was the most influential cleavage that deter-
mined voting behavior in presidential elections. However, the first analysis
did not disclose that the degree of racial uniformity in a district affected the
degree of the one-sidedness of an election result. As Table 10 shows, it
cannot be said that racial uniformity significantly influenced the percentage
of votes for a candidate or candidates whose party won in a district even if
its racial uniformity falls into only two categories, White and non-White,
rather than five categories, White, Black, American Indian and Alaska
Native, Asian and Pacific Islander, and Hispanic or Latino.
Table 11 shows relationship between the percentages of Whites in dis-
tricts and the percentages of votes for Republican candidates and Demo-
cratic candidates in the districts. Although the highest average percentage
of votes for Republican candidates was 53.2 in the districts whose percent-
ages of Whites were more than ninety percent, the highest percentage of
votes for Democratic candidates was 76.8 in the districts whose percentages
of Whites were twenty percent or below. While the lowest average
percentage of votes for Republican candidates was 23.2 in districts whose
percentages of Whites were twenty percent or below, the lowest average
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percentage of votes for Democratic candidates was 46.8 in districts whose
percentages of Whites were over ninety percent. This means that Republi-
can candidates tended to obtain fewer votes in districts with a certain per-
centage of Whites than Democratic candidates in districts that had the same
percentage of non-Whites. This may be a reason that while the percent-
ages of Whites in districts influenced the percentages of votes for the
Republican candidates, degrees of racial uniformity did not affect the per-
centages of votes for candidates whose party obtained more votes than did
the other party. It can thus be said that a difference existed in the degree
of uniformity of voting behavior among racial groups.
The second question is related to how election results are influenced by
population density, number of owned houses, unemployment rates, and
people with bachelor’s degrees or higher. The variables of rural area and
the unemployed showed a positive coefficient and negative coefficient,
respectively, on votes for Republican candidates. However, the former
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Table 10. Results of Analysis of Votes for Winning Party (Racial Uniformity with
Two Categories)
Squared Multiple
Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom Probability Level Correlation for
Variable of Vote
659.845 3 <.001 .105
Variable Standardized p
Coefficient
Vote ← Racial Uniformity –.066 .003
Vote ← The Wealthy .060 .027
Vote ← Young Family .120 <.001
Vote ← Rural Area –.163 <.001
Vote ← The Unemployed .215 <.001
Variable Standardized Total
Effect
Vote ← Racial Uniformity –.192
Vote ← The Wealthy .053
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showed a negative coefficient on the degree of one-sidedness while the lat-
ter showed a positive coefficient. Population density, number of owned
houses, unemployment rates, and people with bachelor’s degrees or higher
were not found to be predictors of the percentage of votes for the winning
party but indicators of the percentage of votes for the Republican
Party. This means that the four indicators for social networks tended to
obtain votes for Republicans rather than promote the formation of social
networks that brought about massive numbers of votes regardless of
ideology. It can be said that social networks which were comprised of
rural people, people living in owned houses, employees, and bachelors or
doctors were apt to support the Republican Party.
Conclusion
This article revealed how social cleavages and social networks functioned in
the United States’ 2002 state House elections. Whites tended to support
Republican candidates. Race was the most reliable predictor of which
party people voted for. However, the degree of racial uniformity in a dis-
trict was not necessarily related to the degree of one-sidedness of a district’s
election result. One reason for this can be the difference in the degree of
uniformity of voting behavior among races. Non-Whites showed a ten-
dency to express a higher degree of unity in casting votes than did
Whites. Moreover, this study made it clear that social networks formed in
rural areas or in workplaces contributed to attracting votes for the Republi-
can Party rather than to securing a massive number of votes for a certain
party regardless of political ideology.
As explained at the outset, the number of Republican state legislators
increased over the number of Democratic state legislators after the 2002
state legislative elections. The analysis in this article revealed that districts
with many Whites produced victories for Republican candidates. Race was
the most reliable indicator of which party won the election in a particular
district. However, the average percentages of votes for Republicans in
votes for the two major parties were about fifty in districts where more than
sixty percent were Whites. The average percentage of votes for Republi-
cans was slightly more than fifty even in districts in which more than eighty
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percent of its residents were Whites. Because there were many districts
where more than eighty percent of residents were Whites, many Republi-
cans were elected. However, the Republican winners did not generally
enjoy one-sided victories in such districts. In this respect, the results of
the 2002 state legislative elections did not necessarily show the Republican
Party’s unshaken strength to be supported by a single racial group.
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